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INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE FOR-PROFIT NURSING HOME:
SOME EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF INSIDE POWER RELATIONS
Cedric Herring
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

ABSTRACT
This paper offers a conceptual model
for understanding
how
and
in what ways externally determined factors affect
power arrangements within a for-profit nursing home setting.
Specifically, this paper links
the activities of nursing
homes as
profit seekers to federal
legislation and the
activities of strategically structured interests which seek
to socialize their costs. Additionally, it shows how social
distinctions and other
factors which have their origins
external to the nursing home setting have consequences for
what takes place inside. The model posits that it is those
people who are members of society's more privileged groups
(professional white males) who will get access to positions
of power
in part because members must go outside the
organization
into
the greater
society
to obtain the
certification which will allow them to occupy powerful
positions.
Consequently, those who have power inside the
organization (professional white males) are very similar
to
those who
have power
in the greater society. Moreover,
observational
data
indicate that
those statuses
which
members
of the nursing home enter with are associated with
patterns of interaction and levels of control and authority.
Finally, there is an attempt to spell out the
implications
of
such findings and an attempt to show how government and
community
(non) involvement
(could) affect
relationships
internal to the nursing home.

As Jansson (1979:362) suggests, "a crucial policy choice that
must be made by public agencies and officials is whether . . . to
provide publicly funded services themselves or
to
utilize
nonprofit or profit-oriented organizations in the private sector."
More and more often, policy makers are depending on the profit

oriented, private sector to provide social services; however, the
costs of providing such social services continue to be met by the
state (O'Connor, 1973).
the
to
outline
have
attempted
theorists
Recently,
attempts
to socialize their
of
capitalists'
consequences
production costs and expenses while keeping profits in their own
For example,
Braverman, 1974).
1973;
(e.g., O'Connor,
hands
that capitalists
Braverman (1974:271) argues that to the extent
costs on to the state while
in passing their
are successful
reaping profits "the capitalist mode of production takes over the
totality of individual, family, social needs, and in subordinating
them to the market, also reshapes them to serve the needs of
capital."
He argues that with the transformation of the society
into a giant market which benefits state-subsidized capitalists,
the
population no longer relies upon social organization in
the forms of family, friends, neighbors, community, elders,
children, but with few exceptions must go to market and only
for food, clothing, and shelter, but
to market, not only
also for recreation, amusement, security, for the care of
young, the old, the sick, the handicapped (Braverman,
the
1974:276).
Braverman goes on to argue that "since no care [for the young, the
is forthcoming from the
and
the handicapped]
old, the sick,
such
cannot
bear all
the
family
and
since
community,
layers
become
these
of all
. . the care
encumbrances.
institutionalized" (p. 280).
Presumably, because these changes in the care of humans are
more often to meet the needs of capital than to benefit those who
make use of the services, the care for humans becomes more profitand more removed from humanistic concerns. The care for
oriented
the young, the old, the sick, and the handicapped becomes more and
more the responsibility of total (care) institutions which seek
precisely what consequences this drive for
profit.
But to see
inside the walls of those total
look
one must
profit has,
institutions which are profit-oriented.

total

is not specifically concerned with profit-oriented
While he
institutions, Goffman (1961) does look inside the walls of
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total Institutions. In his works on total
institutions--"places
of residence and work where a large number of like-situated
individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable
period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered
round of. life"--Goffman (1961:xiii) discusses the roles that
members of these institutions play. He points out that while many
of these roles appear to be "natural," they are for the most part
based on the ability of the various actors to make their
definitions (of what should be done) binding for others.
Many of
these differences in ability to make binding definitions can be
explained in terms of differences in interaction patterns and
content of interactions (among inmates, between inmates and staff,
and among staff members).
However, to understand why these
patterns of interaction exist and persist, it is often necessary
to look beyond the walls of the total institution in that the
total
institution's internal structure reflects the dominant
values
and
priorities of the external society
(Clegg and
Dunkerley, 1977; McNeil,
1978; Salaman, 1978).
Moreover, the
distribution of resources, privilege, and control
inside the
organization are related to the distribution of power in the
broader society (Alford, 1975; Wolff, 1977; Martin, 1980).
However,
as
Martin (1980) notes, studies of internal
organizational structure typically look at groups internal to the
organization and ignore linkages between them and others outside
the boundaries of the institution. As she notes, such views of
organizations are deficient.
In order to understand how a given total institution affects
the behaviors and relationships of its members, not only must one
look
at
the
interpersonal
interactions within that total
institution, but s/he must also examine those factors
(mostly)
external to it which facilitate and reinforce what takes place
inside. Such an attempt is made here. This paper examines the
nursing home as a privately owned, profit-oriented, but largely
state-subsidized total
institution.
An attempt
is made
to
determine how (and to what extent) externally produced/determined
factors
(e.g.,
organization
of
payments,
demographic
characteristics of staff members, professional certifications,
governmental involvement, etc.)
impact relationships within the
nursing
home.
Of special
interest are those institutional
characteristics which are consequences of the nursing home's
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"free-market" profit orientation while receiving state subsidies.
NURSING HOMES AND THE STATE
In the past, shorter life spans made nursing homes and other
long-term care
institutions virtually unnecessary. Brody (1977)
notes that the proportion of elderly people was not
very
large
before
this century,
and
that
it has been only in the past 50
years that a rapid increase in this proportion has occurred.
She
states that "sheer
demography, then, was one of the major
pressures producing growth of
institutional
facilities"
(Brody,

1977:11).
But
demography
is not
the total
answer.
As O'Connor
(1963:41) points out,
"monopoly capital
and
labor also have
favored
socializing
social
consumption expenditures such as
medical costs and workers' retirement income."
Thus, they have
supported
programs which
have been
important to the growth of
state-subsidized nursing homes:
the Social Security Act in 1935,
the Hill-Burton Act in 1946, and Medicare
and Medicaid in
the
mid-1960's.
Alford
(1975) argues that there have also been
strategically structured interests in the health professions which
have historically fought for the passage of such
legislation
in
the form that it has eventually passed.
According
to Reichert
(1975), an important intent of the
Social Security Act was to take older people out of the job market
during the depression era.
He argues that disruptions of the
extended
family, housing shortages, and new mobility among wage
earners all increased the demand for
nursing homes.
However,
because the
law prohibited payments to residents of public
institutions, people took
their relief money and moved into
private homes.
Typically,
these nursing homes were unregulated
and often.of poor quality. Local and county governments entered
the
picture by offering financial
support to those facilities
which agreed to meet certain minimum requirements.

In 1946, the Hill-Burton Act was passed, guaranteeing that
those willing to build and operate nursing homes could be assured
of financial assistance from the federal government. Needless to
say, this gave (potential) owners of nursing homes more incentive
to go into business.

-53-

In 1965, the Medicare and Medicaid amendments were added to
the Social Security Act.
Among other things, these amendments
provided for coverage of medical payments for the elderly and the
indigent in extended care institutions and skilled nursing homes.
With the advent of Medicare and Medicaid payments for patients in
nursing homes, nursing home expenditures rose more than 500
percent from 1966 to 1975 (Gornick, 1976).
For 1977, outlays for
nursing home-related costs reached $12.6 billion.
According to the National Center for Health Statistics (1978)
there were approximately 18,300 nursing homes in the U.S. as of
1977. Of these, over 70% were for-profit operations. These forprofit homes owned approximately 70% of the 1,383,600 beds in
service. Though over 70% of nursing homes are profit-oriented, a
major source of funding for them has been and continues to be
federal-state cost sharing programs such as Medicaid and Medicare
which pay for many of the health care-related expenses of nursing
home patients.
In 1977 for example, the average total monthly charge for
patients who used Medicare as their primary source of payment for
services in a profit-oriented nursing home was more than 75%
greater than total charges for patients who used their own money
to pay for services in nonprofit and government nursing homes
($754 per month compared to $427 per month).
Clearly
then, the state's involvement has facilitated the
growth and profitability of the nursing home industry.
But the
(non) intervention of the state and the greater society also
affects other aspects of the nursing home. The remainder of this
paper will examine some of those factors which originate outside
the boundaries of the nursing home but have consequences for what
occurs within the walls of the nursing home. Much of what follows
is based on data collected from a case study of a profit-oriented,
state-subsidized nursing home.
METHOD
Data
related to the interpersonal relationships within
profit-oriented nursing homes were collected as part of a case
(HVL) nursing home. The data were
study of Huron View Lodge
collected from October of 1980 to April of 1981 using the

participant-as-observer
technique,
archival
research,
study,
the
initial stages of the
interviews.
During
Later
worker.
investigator assumed the role of a volunteer
January) he revealed his "researcher identity."

and
the
(in

While the participant observation techniques employed in this
have some drawbacks, most notably generalizability, they
study
offered some definite advantages: They allowed the investigator an
staff
opportunity to view behaviors of nursing home patients and
in the
social context of the nursing home itself. They provided
to study patterns of interaction in more detail
him the chance
than might have been possible using other methods. This method
also facilitated the use of controlled quasi-experiments in which
And finally, participant
initiated actions.
the
investigator
the
archival
data, enabled
observation, when combined with the
investigator to more fully understand the influence of the "social
structure" of the nursing home on the nursing home members.
FINDINGS
the effects of the
to understand
in order
As mentioned,
institutional setting on behaviors and relationships, one should
consider factors both inside and outside the institution. Figure
1 presents a conceptual model of some of those factors which are
in what ways externally
to understanding how and
important
within
the
institution.
have
effects
determined
factors
Specifically, this model posits that it is those people who are
more privileged groups (professional white
members of society's
access to positions of power within the
males) who will get
This
is true because workers must go outside the
institution.
obtain
to
society in order
organization
into the greater
certification, a type of gatekeeping mechanism which allows only
Consequently, those
positions.
the "worthy" to occupy powerful
who have power inside the organization (professional white males)
are very similar to those who have power in the greater society.
For
this reason, this model predicts that one's position inside
status in the
the institution will be a function of his/her
that power arrangements and
It is expected
society at-large.
those found
parallel
patterns of interaction, therefore, will
beyond the walls of the institution.
The

following

four

dimensions

will

be

examined

in this
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section of this paper: (1) the characteristics of the institution,
(2) characteristics of members which exist prior to and external
to the nursing home setting, (3) types and patterns of interaction
which take place within the walls of the nursing home, and (4) the
to which institutional labels and identities are promoted,
extent
facilitated, and reinforced by the state and the general society.
Kart and Manard (1976) concluded that ownership type, size of
and
of
membership,
composition
demographic
facility,
professionalism of staff were determinants of the quality of care
inferences
While no
receive.
that nursing home patients would
about
the quality of care will be (explicitly) made here, such
information will be presented.
First (and probably foremost), Huron View Lodge (HVL) nursing
state-subsidized
heavily
but
a
profit-oriented,
home
is
with two coIt is a family-owned corporation
institution.
local
owners. Not unlike many businesses, HVL is a member of the
Chamber of Commerce; moreover, it holds certificates of membership
the Michigan
Association of Nursing Homes,
to the National
Care Homes, and
Hospital Association, the Association of Health
the American Health Care Association.
Huron View Lodge, a 71-bed facility, is slightly larger than
the average privately owned, profit-oriented nursing home facility
It is a
approximately 63 beds(NCHS, 1978:Table 142).
which has
skilled nursing facility which offers speech therapy, physical
facilities, and scheduled
therapy, X-ray
therapy, occupational
diversional activities to patients. (In February, 1981) HVL's rate
(FTE) providing direct
equivalent employees
of full-time or
100 beds, 59.2 was also higher than
health-related services per
its staff by
The composition of
the average facility's 45.1.
professional status, race, and sex is presented in Table 1.
to determine patterns of interaction, dominance,
In trying
and social control, one is well-advised to remember that members
institutions "typically have statuses and relationships
in total
for as
into consideration,"
taken
in the outside that must be
points out, "there will always be . . .
122)
(1961:76,
Goffman
in the
some use made of social distinctions already established
environing society. . . . " With this in mind, it is reasonable to
expect that a member's status external to HVL is a determinant of

Table 1.
Composition of Staff by Professional Status, by Race, and by Sex

Professional Status
Professionals
Nonprofessionals
Race (N=81)
Blacks
Whites
Sex (N-81)
Males
Females

(N-81)

Percent
21

79
37
63

32
68

his/her status inside the nursing home. For this reason, it was
hypothesized that
the amount of control --ability to make rules
which are binding for oneself and other institution members -* one has within the confines of the nursing home is related to
factors such as his/her professional status, race and sex which
originate external to the nursing home .
This hypothesis is
consistent with the conceptual model presented in Figure 1 and
will act as a (partial) test of this model.
Data relevant to
testing this hypothesis are presented in Table 2 in terms of
percentages of staff members with much control as a function of
professional status, race, and sex.
The results from this analysis suggest that externally
originating statuses are related to levels of control. For
example, at HVL, no black males (0%) have much control, 5% of the
black females have much control, 29% of the white males have much
control, and 53% of the white females have much control. While it
is likely that much of the difference in level of control can be
attributed to the proporlion of each subpopulation which has
professional status (all X 's are statistically significant at
p<.0l),
it should be noted that the strength of association
between levels of control and professional status varies from one
subpopulation to the next. For example, for black females, there
is a perfect association between professional status and level of
control;
i.e., the Goodman-Kruskal
lambda and Cramer's phi

TABLE 2.
fercentaae with Much Control by Professional Status. Race. and Sex

RACE
BLACK

STATUS

WHITE
SEX

SEX
MALE
NONPRO

PRO

0%
(n-9)

--

(n-O)

TOTAL

0%
(n-g)

TOTAL

FEMALE

MALE

0% )
(n-'20)

8%
(nm13)

100%

100%
(n-1)

(n-4)

5%
(n-21)

%& -100%
No Measures
of Association X2" -8.0
are possible
df -1 I
Lamdaml.0
Phi -1.0
p-vali .01

29%
(n-17)
%k
X

-92%
-13.5

df
a1
Lamda- .80
Phi - .86
p-val .01

-'FEMALE
36%
(n-22)

14%
(n-64)

83%
(n12)

88%
(n=17)

53%
(n-34)

30%
(N-81)

%A
X2

-47%
z7.4

df
a1
Lamda- .38
Phi - .45
P-vaOf .01
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measures of association are equal to 1.0.
The lambda and phi
for
status predicting control
for white males are
.80 and
.86
respectively. For status predicting control
for white females,
lambda= .38 and phi= .45. Because there are no black males at HVL
who hold positions with professional status, there are no measure
of association between status and control for this subpopulation.
These findings are
important to the extent that those with
much control can and do define organizational goals and
are able
to
use
organizational
resources
for
their
personal
and
professional interests.
In the case of HVL, the most powerful
determinant of having much control is one's professional status.
As
Alford
(1975) points, because of licensing practices of
the government, such professionals are virtually guaranteed
a
monopoly on certain kinds of decisions and policies.
These professional monopolists . . . are able to provide a
symbolic screen of legitimacy while maintaining power
in
their own
hands through various organizational devices. A
continuous flow of symbols will
reassure the funding of
allegedly
controlling publics or constituencies about the
functions being performed, while the individuals or groups
which have
a special interest in the income, prestige, or
power generated by
the agency are benefitting
from
its
allocations of resources (Alford, 1975:194).
In other words,
it is from the
society external to the
nursing home that professionals derive their levels of control
on
the
inside.
The
same is true of other statuses, but only to a
lesser degree. To show just how these externally originating
differences
are
(become) relevant to patterns of interaction in
the nursing home, further analysis is provided.
Such findings are also
important
to understanding
the
internal structure of HVL in that there is a profound hierarchical
division of authority, decision-making,
and labor. While such
organizational structure is not peculiar to HVL, nor nursing homes
in general,
in this particular
setting
it has
some rather
interesting
consequences
for
patient-staff and
staff-staff
interactions.
Most notably, because of this division of authority
and division of labor, and the existence of a "that's not my job"
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attitude toward providing services to patients, many of the
and some of the needs of the patients go unattended.

wants

(at least from the patient's point of view),
Unfortunately
matters takes
decision-making on even the seemingly most trivial
hierarchical channels. As Perrow (1972:36) points out, "hierarchy
kicked
everything must be
sluggishness;
promotes delays and
upstairs for a decision either because the boss insists or because
the subordinate does not want to take the risk of making a poor
This is bad news for patients in that higher ups, who
decision."
immediate
on matters of
usually have to give their approval
concern to them, are more or less insulated from patients. Of
those whose jobs include interaction with patients, those with the
As Table 3
least control have the most contact with patients.
shows, of those occupations which include contact with patients as
the
part of the job duties (this excludes maintenance workers),
in the HVL hierarchy jobs are located, the more likely are
higher
Table 3
their incumbents to have little contact with patients .
terms of
contact with patients in
member
staff
presents
percentages with little contact by stratum in the HVL hierarchy.
Table 3.
Percentage With Little Contact by Stratum in the HVL Hierarchy

Lowest

%With Little Contact
11%
(n-44)

Middle

(n-17)

Highest

(n-6)
16%
(N-67)

Stratum

29%

33%
Total

In addition to the fact that a staff member's contact with
patients is inversely related to his/her position in the HVL
hierarchy, Gottesman and Bourestom (1974) observed that only about
2 percent of patient contact with staff involved skilled nursing.
Moreover, they found that about 10 percent of the patients' time

was spent in contact with any staff member. One could argue that
this, at least in part, is also a result of nursing homes' drives
for efficiency and a reflection of their for-profit orientation.
For example, by using unskilled, low status, and low wage labor to
deal with patients, costs are reduced and profits are increased.
Moreover, these patterns of interaction can be explained by the
power of higher ups to define who should and should not attend to
the immediate day-to-day wants and needs of patients.
While higher ups, including the owners insulate themselves
from
patients, they, nevertheless, have access to and are
accountable to funding sources. In the case of HVL, the major
funding source is the state.
Figure 2 diagrams the authority
hierarchy at HVL.
Under the current
social
organization,
patients, who occupy the lowest stratum of the HVL hierarchy, have
very little autonomy.
Barney
(1974) points out the ineffectiveness of ordinary
regulatory mechanisms in dealing with a service such as nursing
home
care, which has a relatively powerless people for a
clientele. She goes on to warn that profit-oriented nursing
homes, in seeking maximum efficiency and productivity, may take
advantage of patients who cannot defend their rights. From this,
it follows that
the less powerful a patient is, the more likely
is the staff of the nursing home to take advantage of him/her .
At times, the fact (or even the notion) that a patient is
"confused"
is used to disqualify his/her contentions.
For
patients at HVL, the process of becoming "confused" is often a
labeling process in its most literal sense.
Staff members
(nurses, nurses' aides, and orderlies) meet weekly to discuss the
eating habits, health statuses, moods, and behaviors of patients.
In these meetings, staff members recount the behaviors of patients
during that week, and patients are diagnosed as being "confused"
in much the same manner that one would be diagnosed as being
hypertensive. However, this particular diagnosis is more casual
though it has more far-reaching consequences for the powerlessness
of patients.
For example, it often becomes convenient for the
staff to deny certain charges and occurrences by simply saying
that a patient is "just confused." While this label appears to
fit some times, at others, the patient's claims are not just
figments of his/her
imagination.
However, at this point, the
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FIGURE 2.
CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE AUTHORITY HIERARCHY AT HVL
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the
patient's claim is often a moot question to the extent that
been applied. This label In and of itself facilitates
has
label
the powerlessness of patients, and often offers them no recourse
So the accuracy or inaccuracy of the
injustices.
to accept
but
in that
label is irrelevant; it is the unchallenged power vested
staff to define who is or is not confused which is of consequence
for patient-staff interactions.
At HVL, the question of patient power becomes even more
when money is involved: patients have virtually no say
clear-cut
in such matters. Even when it comes to money which the patients
Patients may request their
the nursing home controls it.
own,
money, but will receive it only with the approval of the financial
director or the owners, and only then if the financial director or
the owners find the reasons given for the request acceptable. For
He said that
example, one patient received $50 from his brother.
he had had to turn this money over to the financial director. He
asked me to go get it for him because he just knew that they would
I told a secretary in th business office
not give it back to him.
to the financial
She
referred me
request.
of the patient's
director told me of all the paper work
The financial
director.
the patient wanted the money, etc.
involved, asked me why
she did refer me to one of the owners who happened to be
However,
there on that day. The owner told me that there was just too much
the money to the patient for the
hassle involved in getting
He
tried to convince me that I was showing too
reasons given.
finally, he
much concern about how the patient would react. But
told me that I could go out and buy whatever the patient wanted,
In this
and that HVL would reimburse me if I provided receipts.
the wishes of the patient prevailed, but only with the
instance,
such
without
happens
What
intervention of an outsider.
intervention is clear: The requests of the patient are ignored.
patients as
the staff can view most
because
Moreover,
resources
the
nonpaying, incompetent, and/or unable to mobilize
to having their claims respected, they (the staff) can
necessary
Because the clientele at HVL are
ignore the requests of patients.
financial
the
meeting
for
immediately responsible
rarely
be very
the staff need not
themselves,
obligations to HVL
responsive to the complaints, concerns, or wants of the clientele.
Moreover, at least some patients have problems with how their way
is being paid at HVL, and the organization of payments in general.

that was
For example, one new patient was hesitant to eat a meal
She "knew" that the food was not hers
in front of her.
placed
After a combination of
it.
she had not paid for
because
persuasion, an increase in her hunger, and a few cautious looks at
others eating, she ate, but not without continuously voicing her
because the
In short,
reservations about her inability to pay.
organization of payments is such that the cash nexus is hidden
look
into
from patients, few of them assert their consumerism or
alternatives; few of them feel like consumers or believe that they
have viable alternatives to living in the nursing home . Thus,
the nursing home staff need not view them as consumers, nor does
the staff need be responsive to patient claims.
because of its profit orientation, Huron View Lodge
However,
is responsive to the complaints of the government and other
sources of funding. Thus, it follows that HVL need be responsive
to the demands of patients (only) to the extent that they are
The more patients are
source of funding.
viewed as a real
and
they are,
viewed as a source of funding, the more powerful
the nursing home is to their demands . However,
more responsive
the
that
is
such
payments
the organization of
because
government , not the patient, is seen as the source of funding,
HVL can make profits at the expense of the state by minimally
state's requirements and not necessarily those of
meeting the
patients.
to the nursing
state gives
The more direct funding the
home, the less patients are viewed as a source of funding, and the
patients are vis-a-vis others in the nursing home.
less powerful
the powerlessness of
the state facilitates
In other words,
Instead
patients by granting funds directly to the nursing home.
substantially
would
which
giving
patients more power,
of
the state often
as
consumers,
position
their
strengthen
strengthens the position of the nursing home by offering it "costlosses
it from risk of
reimbursement packages" which protect

(Enthoven, 1977)•
Figure 3 shows what the hierarchical structure of HVL might
look like if the social organizati-on were such that patients were
(1) direct payments to
subsidies":
"power
the following
given
intervention of
(2) the
them instead of to the nursing home,
to patients and who do not have to
parties who are sympathetic
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FIGURE 3.
Conceptual Model of the HVL Hierarchy with Patient "Power Subsidies"
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(3) the
rely on the nursing home for funding, and
viable alternatives to living in nursing homes.

provision

of

This diagram suggests a vast redistribution of authority (and
Instead of being the most
thus in autonomy) in favor of patients.
accountable to
and being
the hierarchy
stratum of
dominated
virtually everyone at HVL, patients would probably be more like
Potentially, they would have more discretion in
real
customers.
how their lives are lived. Theoretically, they, with the help of
sympathetic allies, would have influence over the owners, to whom
other staff members at HVL are accountable. To the extent that
patient-staff
relations at HVL are organized around money, they
would be less subdominant to staff members. Most importantly, if
need be, they would be more able to carry out their threats to
The
living arrangements.
leave the nursing home to find better
provision of alternatives would add substance to their threats of
leaving.
In addition to the government, other groups can (potentially)
home.
As Barney
affect relationships internal to the nursing
is a key to improved
(1974)
points out, community presence
Newfield
(1978) suggests, the
But as
conditions for patients.
the public have a limited span of attention when it
media and
and horror
Only in the cases of scandal
comes to nursing homes.
Such attitudes in the general
is the public concerned.
stories
society facilitate the patterns of interaction inside the nursing
home.
As Newfield (1978) points out, nursing homes become statethe handicapped
financed repositories of the old, the sick, and
regulation, family and community
because of
lax governmental
profit-seeking nursing home
noninvolvement, and unscrupulous,
owners.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
nursing home as a privately owned,
This
research on the
was
institution
largely
state-financed
profit-oriented, but
undertaken with the conviction that such research is important but
more or less neglected. Most studies of nursing homes have looked
the quality of care within the nursing home, or have
at either
addressed issues such as cost containment almost as if to separate
part,
For the most
them from what goes on inside nursing homes.
the nature of these studies, and the approaches they
because of
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have used, issues dealing with the quality of care and costs
been systematically separated.

have

However, because of the structural
peculiarities of the
nursing home industry which stem from the fundamental structure of
American society, care of patients and other
issues of staffpatient
interactions must not be
separated from what goes on
outside the nursing home.
This
paper has
tried to
link the
activities
of
nursing homes as
profit seekers to federal
legislation and the activities
of
strategically
structured
interests which
seek to socialize their costs. Additionally, an
attempt was made to show how factors which
have their origins
outside the nursing home have consequences for what takes place
inside. Moreover, it was shown that those statuses which members
of
the nursing home entered with were associated with patterns of
interaction and levels of control and authority within
it.
And
finally, there was an attempt to show how government and community
(non) involvement could potentially affect relationships internal
to the nursing home.
As previously noted, the structural
peculiarities of
the
nursing home industry (a "free-market," profit orientation while
receiving funding from
the state) have made
it difficult
to
separate
issues of cost-efficiency from issues of quality of care
within these institutions. But the relationship between "costs"
and "quality" are not necessarily as one would expect. Because
providers of nursing home care are generally
reimbursed for
whatever costs
they incur rather than on the basis of a standard
rate, there is neither reward for cost-efficiency nor penalty for
waste.
Meanwhile, as profit seekers, there is little incentive
for them to provide a quality of service beyond the minimum which
will guarantee
them a profit.
For many other kinds of services,
the
resolved in
and quality can be
of costs
these issues
marketplace:
people simply reveal their preferences by how they
industry,
But in the case of the nursing home
spend their money.
in which the
state pays
the costs of services provided, the
its
nursing home is not overly dependent on those who make use of
facilities for its funding. Thus, it is not necessary for nursing
homes to view patients as consumers who are to be satisfied. They
only need to be responsive to the requirements of the state and
In short,
have their beds filled in order
to secure profits.
under the current organization of payments, nursing homes can make
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profits at the expense of the state by only minimally meeting the
(and not necessarily those of patients who
state's requirements
make use of these services).

The problem of public policy design
is to define the
to achieve desirable social
appropriate role for government
the
If a desired goal is to improve
purposes most effectively.
quality of
life for the elderly, the sick, and the handicapped
is not
while reducing (or at least containing) costs, and if it
to
increase the profits of nursing home
(necessarily) desirable
To
owners, then clearly the strategy currently in use is flawed.
correct this, the government must provide more alternatives (such
as community-based adult day care, home health care services,
homemaker services, and communal living arrangements) to those who
would usually end up in institutions. A threat is only as good as
its ability to be carried through; therefore, it is up to those on
sure that a patient's threat to leave the
the outside to make
confines of a nursing home can be acted out if necessary by making
provisions for alternatives. Direct payment, as opposed to the
for
provide the potential
current organization of payments,
them.
For
those who do
alternatives to those who might seek
the state and others can facilitate
become
institutionalized,
their receiving better quality treatment by insuring that nursing
service also forbecome not only for-profit, but
homes
oriented.
NOTES
1Staff members with little control
are those who have no
supervisory nor policy-setting duties as part of their jobs; staff
members with much control are those who do have supervisory and/or
as part of their jobs. Because of the
policy-setting capacities
research methods employed, all data statistically analyzed are
'objective," i.e., coded according to observable (nonattitudinal)
criteria.
2

Rather than just
detractina from the explanatory powers
of Table 2, the existence of zero cells adds substantively to the
insight
into the power
meaning of the table and gives greater
relationships in the nursing home; that is, it is shown that there
is no such thing as a black male with professional status at HVL.

Moreover, there are no black males at HVL who have much control.
Conversely,
there are no white males who hold positions with
not
have much
control.
All
professional status and do
some of the white females, have much
professionals, except for
control in this setting.
3A logit analysis of Table 2 (not presented here)
indicates
that professional status, race, and sex are all related to one's
interactive effect for
level of control at HVL.
There
is an
professional
white females which predicts that they will have
the nursing
lower levels of control than other professionals in
When one statistically controls the simultaneous
home setting.
effects of these variable, the following coefficients and equation
result:
Log Odds

(Much Control)-

.60sE x

98 NTERACTION )

-

(1Ali3

x (-2.55 + 1.89STATUS + 1.51RACE +

when

1 Professional
STATUS= 0 Otherwise

RACE=

1 White
0 Otherwise

SEX=

1 Female
0 Otherwise

INTERACTION=

1 White Professional Female
0 Otherwise
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